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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Considerations of constitutional law play a significant role in
the organic growth of the law. Those considerations have been
primarily responsible for identifying and defining the scope of
individual liberties and for delineating the powers and obligations
of government.
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
responded to a number of cases which dealt with personal freedoms. Some involved direct and explicit impingements upon the
rights of a few individuals; others involved the evaluation and
reconciliation of larger societal values and interests. The court
extended constitutional protection to a group of college instructors whose contracts were not renewed because of personality
conflicts with the school administration' and to five anti-war
demonstrators whose freedom of expression had been circumscribed. 2 Another of the continuing assaults on a woman's qualified right to elect to have an abortion was resolved favorably for
the three women plaintiffs.' And the Tenth Circuit remanded
three obscenity decisions4 to the trial court for reconsideration in
light of Miller v. California.5
Of particular significance are the decisions evaluating relatively recent attempts to redefine the rights of large groups of
Americans. The Tenth Circuit's decision requiring a New Mexico
school district to provide its Spanish surnamed students with
bilingual education' is one of the first judicial responses to the
opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court of less than a year ago mandating similar action in a California school district.7 The court
also considered one of the growing number of assaults being made
against charitable service organizations which restrict membership only to males.8
Both the extent and the limitation of governmental powers
were scrutinized by the court in other cases. The constitutional
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Ewing, 491 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harding,
491 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973).
413 U.S. 15 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881.
* Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d
883 (10th Cir. 1974).
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validity of the Denver sign code was resolved to uphold the municipal action, but the court recognized that the exercise of that
governmental function and right was not without limitation., The
role of judicial review in military actions provided two important
decisions for the inservice conscientious objector."
The construction of the Constitution and the resolution of
constitutional issues and questions are "always open to discussion when [they are] supposed to have been founded in error."' "
The sophisticated growth of our fundamental law is nurtured and
sustained by that discussion.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974)
This controversy, involving first amendment rights, arose by
virtue of the dismissal of 14 employees from the Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts.' Prior to these dismissals, the college had
undergone serious difficulties including divisions among the faculty, financial troubles, a decline in enrollment, and the placement of the school on probation as an accredited institution.! The
former president left because of these problems and the new president, Dr. Bruce Carter, was hired to improve a situation which
he described as "very bad, very critical."'
To accomplish this task, Carter decided to retain only those
employees whom he felt the administration could "live with" and
not rehire those "who were devisive [sic] . . . who would not
cooperate . . . who would not work" with him and the administration.' He identified 11 faculty members and 3 administrative
officials as being divisive and recommended to the Board of Regents that the contracts of the 14 not be renewed. After the Board
accepted this recommendation, the dismissed employees initi5
ated an action in federal district court.
Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
0 Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974) and Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307
(10th Cir. 1973).
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting).
1

The college is a state operated institution controlled by OKLA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 70,

§§ 3601-06 (1972). Located at Chickasha, it was originally accredited in 1920 and, with
913 students, the primary area of study at the college is teacher education. AaEoucAN
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, ACCREDITED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1969-1970, at 86
(1969).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1109 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1099 (Appendix).
Id. at 1100 (Appendix).
The claims were brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970) which provides
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In their complaint, the employees alleged that the terminations were improper in that they resulted from the exercise by the
plaintiffs of their first amendment rights of expression and association. The district court ruled against the dismissed employees,
holding that the terminations were unconnected with the employees' exercise of first amendment rights.6
I. THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the trial court with Chief Judge Lewis and Judges Seth
and Barrett dissenting.7 Judge Doyle, writing for the majority,
found that because the district court "adopted the conclusion of
President Carter that the plaintiffs were 'divisive' and that this
was the cause of the conflict and the firings," ' the findings of the
trial court "must be considered out of harmony with the evidence
and clearly erroneous." 9
According to the majority, the reason for the dismissal was
not the plaintiffs' divisiveness, but rather their refusal to conform
to the loyalty and obedience demanded from them by Dr. Carter.
The court said:
Dr. Carter demanded absolute loyalty, required faculty members to
come in and visit with him, prohibited their discussing problems of
the college among themselves and prohibited their having informal
discussions with students, for if they did any of these things they
were considered by Carter to be "divisive." . . . Thus, we conclude
that, in exercising their right to freely associate with others and to
criticize the administration . . . and in refusing to submit to the
0
exercise of control over them, the plaintiffs were fired.

Because the classification of the plaintiffs as divisive was so arbitrary," their dismissal on that basis was a violation of their first
amendment rights."
for declaratory relief, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides relief for deprivation of
civil rights under color of state law.
1 501 F.2d at 1092. The dismissal of one of the employees, Professor Rampey, was held
by the district court to be improper because he had acquired tenure and was entitled to a
hearing. Id. at 19 n.5. The other professors did not acquire tenure because it was abolished
by the Board of Regents in May 1972. In abolishing tenure, the Board was acting against
the intention of the legislature which contemplated that the Board would "[e]stablish
and maintain plans for tenure. . . of employees at the Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 3606(k) (1972).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
I at 1097.
Id.
Ild. at 1099. In his dissent, Judge Barrett strongly disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. See note 23 infra.
,0Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1099.
In Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1966), the plaintiff was dis-
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The first amendment rights that were infringed upon by the
dismissals were not, however, clearly identified by the court. Because the majority believed that the impermissible restrictions on
these rights resulted from the attempted domination by Dr.
Carter over the fired employees, it ruled that "the right to be free
from this kind of personality control is a constitutionally protected right under the First Amendment since it is a species of
expression." 1 3 The firings, which were based on the employees'
exercise of their right to be free from personality control, infringed
upon their first amendment rights and were, therefore, invalid. 4

II.

FIsRT AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN

Rampey

In Rampey, the court identifies freedom from personality
control as a constitutionally protected form of expression. In so
concluding, has the court created a new first amendment right
from freedom of expression? What limitations are placed by the
court on freedom from personality control? Has it expanded the
protection heretofore afforded nontenured teachers?
A.

Freedom of Expression and Association in Relation to Freedom from Personality Control

1. Freedom of Expression
Judge Seth, in his dissent, objects to the majority's conclusion that first amendment rights are involved in Rampey. His
criticism of the majority is based on the court's inability to point
to "specific incidents or criticism [or a] specific exercise of free
speech."' 5 The dismissed employees did allege, however, a link
between their termination and a press conference held two days
prior to the announcement of the nonrenewal of their contracts."
In respect to this allegation, Rampey is similar to other cases
charged, in part, because of her "disagreements with her Principal." The court said that
the dismissal on this basis was improper, but the reason given was not the infringement
of first amendment rights, even though the dismissal was caused by her civil rights activities. Instead, the court invalidated the dismissal because it was arbitrary and capricious.
" Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The court cited Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), as support for the
proposition that a person cannot be fired for reasons that infringe his constitutionally
protected rights. Even though there was a showing that first amendment rights were
impaired by the dismissals, the court did not consider the possibility that a hearing might
be required before the employment of the teachers was terminated. For a discussion of
how Sindermann, when read with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), might
require such a hearing, see Shulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty:Some Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DENvER L.J. 215 (1974).
Is Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1107 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
"6 Brief for Appellant at 14, Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974).
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involving dismissed teachers in which there is an attempt to establish an unconstitutional nexus between the dismissals and
specific exercises of the right of expression." A failure to establish
a link of this nature has been sufficient to sustain the nonrenewal
of the contract." In Moore v. Winfield City Board of Education,"
for example, the plaintiff alleged that her termination was the
result of a speech she made criticizing the school board; this
speech "emerged as the principal issue" in the case. 0 The court
concluded in Moore that the nonrenewal of her contract was not
motivated by this speech and the other reasons advanced for the
termination of her employment were sufficient to sustain the
2
school's action. '
The plaintiffs in Rampey failed to establish a link between
22
their press conference and the nonrenewal of their contracts.
Despite this failure, the Tenth Circuit did not sustain the dismissals.2 3 Instead the court looked beyond a single incident to a
series of incidents involving expression. These incidents, taken
individually, would not constitute expression, but by joining
these separate incidents of "dissent, criticism or disagreement"

" See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public criticisms of Regents'
policies and testimony before a legislative hearing); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968) (letter critical of school board written to newspaper); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d
334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2604 (1973) (teacher involvement in political
activities); Gieringer v. Center School Dist., 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 832 (1973) (impromptu report critical of administration); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d
928 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1972) (criticism of curriculum); Hostrop v. Board
of Educ., 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973) (public circulation
of confidential memo); Russo v. Center School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1972) (symbolic protest of the Viet Nam war); Duke v. North Texas State
University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (public criticism
of school); Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130
(1973) (participation in anti-Viet Nam war rallies).
18See, e.g., Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974).
19452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 727.
11Id.
22 Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1091 (10th Cir. 1974). It was clear from testimony
given at trial that the list of those who would not be rehired was compiled 2 days prior to
the day the press conference was held.
23 It was on this point that Judge Barrett strongly disagreed with the majority. He
felt that the only first amendment issue Rampey raised was whether the plaintiffs were
dismissed because of the press conference. Since it was clear from the evidence that the
press conference was not the cause, Judge Barrett thought that the trial court's findings
should be sustained in that they were not clearly erroneous. In his opinion, the majority
was substituting its conclusion as to how the trial court should have decided the case. To
do this, Judge Barrett said, was a clear abuse of the role of an appellate court. See Zenith
Co. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364 (1948).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

together, the court found an infringement of first amendment
rights.2" The infringement was not upon the right of expression
per se, but rather upon a "species of expression.""5 This species
of expression was identified by the court as freedom from personality control.
2. Freedom of Association
The court suggests in Rampey that the plaintiffs were fired,
in part, for "exercising their right to freely associate with others." 2 The court points out that Carter "considered that the
group as a whole was 'divisive' because they associated together"
and they refused to join certain teacher organizations which
Carter asked them to join."
Freedom of association, which is a form of expression protected by the first amendment, 8 is usually asserted to protect
organizations from state interference,2 individuals who belong to
certain organizations,30 and the right of individuals to organize for
political purposes. 3' In McLaughlin v. Tilendis,32 for example, the
Eighth Circuit did not sustain the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract because the action, which was based on his association with
a union, was found to be an unconstitutional infringement of his
first amendment rights.3
The rights of association involved in Rampey are not so clear.
There was no formal organization to which the 14 belonged, but
rather there was a vague assertion by Dr. Carter that the fired
employees tended to associate only with each other. Similarly,
the dismissed employees were classified as divisive not because
they joined an organization, but rather because they refused to
join the ones Carter wished them to associate with. The court is
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).

2,

23 Id.

Id. at 1096.
2Id.

n Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
n See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
' See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
31 See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972).
- 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). For other cases involving a teacher's right of association, see Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Doherty v.
Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
33

Id.

1975
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protecting freedom of association, but the form of association
protected is a freedom to refuse "to conform to . . .patterns and
molds" imposed upon one. 3 4 Therefore, freedom from personality
control seems to contain elements of freedom of association.
B.

Limitations on Freedom from Personality Control

The majority in Rampey recognizes that freedom from personality control is not an absolute right and is subject to the
balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Education.35 In Pickering,
which involved the dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter to a
newspaper, the Court balanced the "conflicting claims of First
Amendment protection and the need for orderly school administration.""6 In doing so, the following factors were considered by
the Court: the need to maintain discipline and harmony among
coworkers; the need for confidentiality in a relationship between
a teacher and an administrator; the personal loyalty and confidence needed for the proper functioning of the school; the danger
that conflict and controversy would embroil the school; and the
possibility that the teacher's exercise of first amendment rights
would impede his performance in the classroom or interfere with
37
the operation of the school generally.
In Rampey the court considered some of the tests identified
in Pickering. The majority found that there was "no evidence
that the appellants constituted any threat to the operation of the
college; ' 3 there was no "threat to the valid authority of President
Carter; '39 and there was no need for "personal loyalty or devotion" in this case.' 0 In balancing the teachers' interest in freedom
from personality control against the state's interest in the orderly
administration of the school, the Rampey court did not consider
the need to maintain discipline or harmony among coworkers or
the extent of the controversy that was embroiling the campus.
The reason why these factors were not considered is not stated;"
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
M Id. at 569.
For an application of the balancing test outlined in Pickering,see Clark v. Holmes,
474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Duke v. North Texas State
University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974).
"Id.
aId.
" But in Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971), the court
held that, even if speech had played a part in the teacher's dismissal, the constitutionally
protected right to comment on school activities was limited and was to be balanced
against orderly school administration.
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but because freedom from personality control by its nature creates controversy and disharmony, it may be the court felt that
these factors should not be weighed against the individual's right
to be free from control of his personality.
III. CONCLUSION
Freedom from personality control, as defined by the Tenth
Circuit in Rampey v. Allen, is a first amendment right derived
from the constitutional protection afforded to association and
expression. The boundaries of this new species of expression are
vague, but they appear to encompass the forms of expresssion and
association that arise in the ordinary, day-to-day interaction of
individuals working together.4 2 The protection given by this right
is broader than that afforded by expression or association alone.
In cases arising before other circuits, a showing of an unconstitutional link between the dismissal and a specific incident involving
expression was required before the court would reverse the action
of the school.43 Rampey does not require this type of link. Rather
than having to show a specific incident that caused the nonrenewal, the plaintiff need show only a series of separate events which,
taken together, evidence an atomosphere that repressed the individual's right to be free from personality control.
The security of professors and teachers at public schools is
enhanced by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Rampey because
these members of the academic community need no longer fear
that their contracts will not be renewed because of a personality
conflict with their superior. This broad protection, however, may
not be as salutary as it appears. The Rampey decision ignores the
interest of the state in operating "a college in a manner in which
its elected and appointed officials think will best serve its state
interests." 4 The protection given to the employees, moreover,
may effectively limit the discretion of school administrators to
42 In his dissent, Judge Seth questions whether freedom from personality control
should be given constitutional protection:
The majority is substituting tenure reasons for a constitutional right. This
is innovative and would perhaps serve a worthwhile purpose. It could serve
as a protection against terminations based on "inability to conform to the
image of the president" of the school .... This type of protection from
"personality control" has a great deal to recommend it, and it would appear
that the various state tenure laws have something like this in view. Thus
perhaps we should subscribe to such a concept, but I am unable to fit it into
the protections afforded by the First Amendment to the Constitution . . ..
Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1107 (10th Cir. 1974) (Seth, J., dissenting).
43 See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
"' Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1110 (10th Cir. 1974) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
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select what they consider to be the best possible staff if personality conflict can be alleged to frustrate justified nonrenewal of
contracts.
United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973)

B.

United States v. Gourley 5 arose from the conviction of five
anti-war demonstrators who, after being issued "bar letters" by
the commander of the Air Force Academy, reentered the base in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382.46 The crucial question considered
by the Tenth Circuit was whether the five defendants could challenge their convictions on the grounds that the issuance of the bar
letters infringed their constitutional rights of free speech.
To resolve this issue, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in Flowers v. United States." In that case a leafleteer was
convicted for entering a military base after a letter barring his
entry had been issued. In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Whatever power the authorities may have to restrict general access
to a military facility . . . here the fort commander chose not to
exclude the public from the street where petitioner was arrested

Under such circumstances the military has abandoned any
claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes
leaflets on the avenue. The base commandant can no more order
petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets
than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public street
The First Amendment protects petitioner from the application
of § 1382 under conditions like those of this case.'"

A challenge to a conviction under section 1382 could be based on
the validity of the bar letter issued by the commander of the base.
To be constitutional, the bar letters restricting entry to the military base can be issued only if the base is one closed to the public
and, in cases applying Flowers, this is the critical issue."
45 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) provides in part:
Whoever reenters or is found within any . . . reservation, post, fort,
arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom
or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge
thereofShall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six

months, or both.
'

407 U.S. 197 (1972).

Id. at 198.
"

See, e.g., Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973); McGaw v. Farrow, 472
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In Gourley the Tenth Circuit found that even though "the
Academy [had been] declared a closed base," the open nature
of the areas where the defendants were arrested-the football
stadium and the Academy Chapel-outweighed this formal declaration and the Academy was open to the public 1° Because of
this, "the letters [could not] serve as a basis for the charges" and
the convictions were reversed.'
Charles P. Leder

II.

EQUAL PROTECTION-BILINGUAL EDUCATION
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,
499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974)
In 1972 the Federal District Court for New Mexico found that
a school district which failed to teach English to non-English
speaking Spanish surnamed students' had violated the students'
equal protection right and statutory right' to be free from discrimination in a program receiving federal financial assistance. As a
remedy the court ordered bilingual-bicultural education. 3
Significantly, plaintiffs in Serna v. Portales Municipal
F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1973); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir.), applicationfor stay of
judgment denied, 409 U.S. 971 (1972).
'o United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1973).
' Id. at 788.
As used by the district court and the court of appeals, "Spanish surnamed" refers
to Mexican Americans or Chicanos. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN
EDUCATION STUDY, ETHNIC ISOLATION OF MEXICAN AMERICANS INTHE PUBuc SCHOOLS oF THE
SOUTHWEST, REPORT I at 7 n.1 (1971).
As of 1972 there were 5.3 million Mexican Americans in the United States, 87 percent
of whom lived in the 5 Southwestern States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Texas. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 1972 AND 1971, P-20, No. 250 at 1 (1973).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970):
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.

T.

ANDERSON

& M. BOYER, 1 BILINGUAL

SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES

12 (1970)

(prepared under contract with HEW):
[W]hat is bilingual schooling? We take as our working definition that . . .
"Bilingual education is instruction in two languages and the use of those two
languages as mediums of instruction for any part or all of the school curriculum. Study of the history and culture associated with a student's mother
tongue is considered an integral part of bilingual education."
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Schools4 did not allege de jure segregation, 5 and no such finding
was made. Prior to this case, no school district had been ordered
to implement bilingual-bicultural education absent a finding of
de jure segregation.'
Spanish surnamed students accounted for 26 percent of the
enrollment in the Portales school system.7 Many of these students
spoke Spanish at home and had an English language deficiency
when they entered school.' Classroom instruction in Portales
schools was conducted solely in English.
As a group, Spanish surnamed students scored lower on
achievement tests, given solely in English, than did their Anglo
classmates. In the elementary school with an 86 percent Spanish
surnamed enrollment, these students fell increasingly further
behind their Anglo classmates on intelligence quotient tests as
they moved from the first to the fifth grades. As these disparities
grew, so did disparities in attendance and dropout rates. These
were undisputed facts.'
Prior to this suit, the defendant school district had not taken
any steps to meet the special educational needs of these stu499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974), aff'g in part 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
It is the similarity of these programs which is the crux of plaintiffs' claim of
inequality of educational opportunity.
351 F. Supp. at 1281.
1 As part of a desegregation plan to dismantle de jure segregated schools, bilingualbicultural education was ordered in United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex.
1970), modified, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971),
applicationfor stay denied, sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1206 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); connected cases, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd,
466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972); 356 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1974).
1 At the elementary school level, 34 percent of all students were Spanish surnamed.
In one elementary school, 86 percent of the enrollment was Spanish surnamed. In the other
3 elementary schools, 78 to 88 percent of the students were Anglos. Junior high enrollment
was 29 percent Spanish surnamed. Only 17 percent of the high school students were
Spanish surnamed. 499 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1974).
The term "limited English-speaking ability", when used with reference to an individual, means(B) individuals who come from environments where a language other
than English is dominant. . . and, by reason thereof, have difficulty speaking and understanding instruction in the English language.
Bilingual Education Act § 703(a)(1), Act of August 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 105,
88 Stat. 484, amending 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970). [This amendment was enacted subsequent to the decision by the court of appeals in Serna. It evidences greater congressional
commitment to bilingual education than the 1968 Act. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the 1968 Act as existing at the time of the decision by the court of appeals.]
1 499 F.2d at 1149-50.
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dents.10 The defendant was a recipient of federal financial assistance. Based upon this evidence, the district court found a violation of the equal protection clause and a violation of section 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The defendant's appeal in Serna was pending when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Lau v. Nichols." Chinese speaking students in Lau had alleged equal protection and section 601 violations identical to those of plaintiffs in Serna. In finding a section
601 violation, the Supreme Court observed that failure to teach
the English language to non-English speaking students, while all
courses were taught in English, had the "effect" of discrimination
"even though no purposeful design [to discriminate] is present.' 3 Having found a statutuory right and violation, the Supreme Court declined to consider the alleged equal protection
violation."'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Serna adopted the
20 The defendant had not accepted state funds for bilingual education nor had it
applied for funds under the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970).
" Mexican Americans are an identifiable group for purposes of discrimination prohibited on the basis of race, color, or national origin. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S.
189, 197 (1973); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D.
Tex. 1970).
12414 U.S. 563 (1974).
ld. at 568.
I3
' There apparently was some confusion as to whether the constitutional authority for
Congress to enact section 601 was founded on the equal protection clause or on the general
welfare clause. The amicus curiae brief of the United States argued:
Title VI, although written in equal protection terms, is neither dependent upon, nor necessarily coincident with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather it is grounded on the general authority
of the federal government to place reasonable restrictions upon the use of
federal funds by the recipients.

Thus, the application of Title VI here does not depend upon the outcome
of the equal protection analysis. Pursuant to the power of Congress to "provide (in its expenditures) for the * * * general Welfare of the United States
* * " (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 1), enhanced like all other
congressional powers by Article I's "necessary and proper" clause, the statute independently proscribes the conduct challenged by the petitioners and
provides a discrete basis for injunctive relief.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
In fact this appears to be the approach adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for
the Court in Lau:
The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which itsmoney
allotments to the States shall be disbursed. Whatever may be the limits of
that power, they have not been reached here.
414 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted).
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same approach in reviewing the district court's decision.' 5 The
court of appeals' decision was limited to finding a section 601
violation with no comment being made on the equal protection
argument. This limitation had no adverse effect upon the relief
granted.
Four primary issues were considered by the court of appeals
in Serna.'6 First, the defendant argued that its failure to provide
compensatory English instruction to Spanish surnamed nonEnglish speaking students did not violate the students' equal
protection right. Second, it was argued that such conduct by the
defendant did not violate the students' section 601 right. Third,
the defendant contended, assuming some right had been violated,
that the district court had exceeded its authority in the relief
granted. Fourth, as amicus curiae, the New Mexico State Board
of Education asked if a decision favorable to the plaintiffs would
require bilingual-bicultural education whenever there was one
student in a school district who did not understand English.
I. EQuAL PROTECTION
Most of the legal literature examining the rights of nonEnglish speaking students has focused on the equal protection
argument. The underlying assumption is that an equal protection
right, if recognized, would offer the greatest protection. 7 Notwithstanding the merits of this argument, it would seem that the
Supreme Court foreclosed this approach in Lau. Equal protection
clearly was before the Court, and just as clearly the Court avoided
it.
At the present time, it seems that equal protection is not
favored by the Supreme Court as a means for exploring or finding
"new" fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. In
499 F.2d at 1153.
"The defendant also challenged the plaintiffs' standing and suitability as class action representatives. Both of these issues were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 499 F.2d
at 1152.
" Grubb, Breaking the LanguageBarrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. L. L. REv. 52 (1974); Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protectionfor NonEnglish-Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62 CALF. L. Rsv. 157 (1974); Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-Equal Protection-School District's Failure to Teach Chinese
Speaking Students the English Language Does Not Constitute a Violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, 2 FORDHAM URmAN L.J. 122 (1974); Note, The Constitutional Right of
Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 943 (1974);
Comment, Breaking the Language Barrier: New Rights for California's Linguistic
Minorities,5 PAC. L.J. 648 (1974). See also for an overview of English language legislation,
Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NoT DAME LAw. 7
(1969).
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DeFunis v. Odegaard5 the Court avoided a difficult equal protection challenge by an unsuccessful white applicant to a law
school's minority admission standards.19 Since the applicant,
after having been conditionally admitted to the law school, was
about to graduate when the merits of his case reached the Court,
the Court declined to decide the issue on the theory of mootness.
As in Lau, the Court was avoiding an equal protection problem.
Equal protection suffered more serious setbacks in other Court
decisions holding education, 20 housing, 2' and welfare 22 not to be
fundamental rights. Against this history, it could be argued that
the result in Lau might have been different had it been considered solely on an equal protection theory.
Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 113 is the Court's most definitive
recent decision on school segregation. On an equal protection
theory the Court employed an "intent" or "purpose" to segregate
test for de jure segregation.2 4 By contrast, the Court utilized an
"effect" test for discrimination under a statute in Lau.
It is premature to consider whether in fact there is a substantive difference in these tests. The Court may be employing different words to avoid the appearance of using the same standard to
determine whether state action "causes" a result. However, if the
choice in words reflects different standards, then it would seem
less onerous to prove a section 601 violation under the "effect"
test. "Motivation" is more difficult to prove than the "result."
The court of appeals in Serna, relying on Lau, found it unnecessary to consider the equal protection issue since it was able
to affirm the section 601 violation.
" 416 U.S. 312 (1974).

19 Note, Ameliorative Racial Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1126.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Two facts distinguish Rodriguez from Serna and Lau. In Serna and Lau the failure to teach English to
non-English speaking students accomplished the "absolute deprivation" which the Court
did not find in the state's financing scheme in Rodriguez. Id. at 20-25. Second, while the
Court in Rodriguez said that the wealth-poverty dichotomy is not a suspect classification,
it is clear that the suspect classification based on race, color, or national origin was present
in Serna and Lau.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
" 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
We emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann [402 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1971)] is purpose or intent to segregate.
413 U.S. at 208.
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HEW GUIDELINES
Section 601 contains a general prohibition against discrimination." Under section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress authorized departments and agencies granting financial
assistance to issue rules, regulations, and orders of general appli1I.

SECTION

601

AND THE

cation to effectuate section 601.26

Pursuant to this authority, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued guidelines for compliance with Title
VI which provide:
A recipient .

.

. may not .

.

. utilize criteria or methods of

administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination . . . or have the effect of defeating or substantially

impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."

Specific forms of discrimination are prohibited by these guidelines. The guidelines further provide that "[tihe enumeration of
specific forms of prohibited discrimination

. . .

does not limit the

"28
generality of the prohibition ....
Failure to provide compensatory English instruction to nonEnglish speaking minority students clearly has the "effect" of
defeating the accomplishment of an educational program. HEW's
1970 May 25th Memorandum so informed school districts receiving federal aid.n
In Lau the Supreme Court specifically relied upon these
guidelines and the May 25th Memorandum in evaluating the
school district's conduct. 30 Courts had previously relied upon the
guidelines in de jure school segregation cases.' Although such
review and approval had not previously included the application
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
" Id. § 2000d-1.
Nondiscrimination Under Programs Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
Through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Effectuation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1973).
n Id. § 80.3(b)(5).
" As part of their compliance, school districts were informed by HEW that they
should take remedial steps to overcome English language deficiencies among minority
students; discontinue the assignment of these students to classes for the mentally retarded
on the basis of tests measuring English language skills; and design tracking and ability
grouping, where necessary, to meet language problems as quickly as possible and not to
design such programs as permanent tracks. Identification of Discrimination and Denial
of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970).
414 U.S. 567-69.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1001 (1967).
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of the May 25th Memorandum or the guidelines in the context of
language discrimination, there is a presumption that such rules
and regulations are valid.3" Recipients of financial assistance give
an assurance, moreover, that they will comply with the guidelines
and "all requirements imposed by or pursuant to" the guidelines .33
Against this background, thc court of appeals considered the
defendant's appeal in Serna. The defendant had not designed a
program to meet the special educational needs of non-English
speaking Spanish surnamed students; and these students were
not benefiting from the educational program being offered to the
same extent as their Anglo classmates. The program had the
"effect" of discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. The district court's finding of a section 601 violation was,
therefore, affirmed. 4

III.

THE REMEDY:

Too

MUCH OR

Too LrrrLE?

Although Lau recognized the right to some form of relief, it
did not articulate what that relief should be. Future litigation will
most likely focus on this problem. Serna is significant in that it
provides a beginning for consideration of this problem.
The remedial plan submitted by the defendant in Serna
called for bilingual education for some, but not all, non-English
speaking students.35 This plan was found to be inadequate and
the district court then fashioned a broader remedy. At the elementary school, with an 86 percent Spanish surnamed enrollment, all students in grades 1-3 were to receive 60 minutes of
bilingual-bicultural instruction per day, and all students in
grades 4-6 were to receive 45 minutes of such instruction per day.
Spanish surnamed students at the other 3 elementary schools
32 The

critical question is, therefore, whether the regulations and guidelines
promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of § 601. Last Term . . . we
held that the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general authorization provision such as § 602 of [Title] VI "will be sustained so long as it
is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'" I think
the guidelines here fairly meet that test.
414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted).
" 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(a)(1) (1973).
" 499 F.2d at 1153-54.
" Since the district court had also found that the defendant had discriminated
against Mexican American teachers in employment, the defendant promised in this plan
to hire "qualified" Spanish surnamed teachers as vacancies permitted. 499 F.2d at 1152.
At trial, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on employment discrimination
against Mexican Americans in non-teaching positions. 351 F. Supp. at 1283.

1975

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

were to receive 30 minutes of such instruction per day.36 Junior
high students were to be tested for English language deficiencies
with bilingual instruction to be made available on the basis of
need. Ethnic studies were to be retained and expanded at the
high school. 3 The defendant was further ordered to consider these
changes as minimum curriculum modifications.3 Finally, the
defendant was ordered to seek funding for these programs from
39
available state and federal sources.
On appeal the defendant argued that the district court's
order was an "unwarranted and improper judicial interference in
the internal affairs of the Portales school district."10 In view of the
defendant's past neglect of the plaintiffs' special educational
needs and evidence received by the trial court that the defendant's proposed remedy was only a "token plan that would not
benefit appellees," the court of appeals affirmed the remedy."
Under these circumstances, the court of appeals felt that "the
trial court had a duty to fashion a program which would provide
adequate relief ... "42
A serious question exists, however, as to whether in fact the
trial court fully discharged that duty. For 30 to 60 minutes of each
day non-English speaking children are admitted to the educational process.' But then what? The program reverts to a language these children do not understand. Additionally, which
courses are taught during the bilingual-bicultural component of
each day's instruction? More important, which courses are not
taught during this remedial period?" There is a danger that a
limited remedy such as this might heighten a non-English speakU This program was to be open to Anglo students as funding and personnel permitted.
499 F.2d at 1151.
" The court's plan called upon the defendant to make a special effort to hire qualified
bilingual teachers as vacancies occurred. 499 F.2d at 1151-52.
n A recalcitrant defendant is more likely to look upon the court's minimums as its
maximums.
n Supra note 10.
499 F.2d at 1154.

4 Id.

,2Id. (emphasis added).
'
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals explains why some non-English
speaking children receive more bilingual instruction than others.
" "[A] child is not to receive instruction in any substantive courses in a language
which prevents his/her effective participation in any such course . . . ." This is part of
the consent decree entered, subsequent to Lau, in a suit brought by Puerto Ricans against
the New York City school system. ASPIRA of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 724002 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
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ing child's frustration with the school system. The remedy here
afforded would seem only a slight improvement over that which
these children previously faced.
In Lau the Supreme Court favorably relied upon a 1968 HEW
guideline: "[Situdents of a particular race, color, or national
origin are not [to be] denied the opportunity [to] obtain the
education generally obtained by other students in the [school]
system."" Although it is difficult to understand how 30 to 60
minutes of bilingual instruction per day satisfy this requirement,
the court of appeals was convinced that the remedy was "just,
equitable and feasible."" Furthermore, there is a latent danger
in providing a remedy in cases of this kind that non-English
speaking students will be segregated from their English speaking
classmates47 in violation of Brown v. Board of Education." These
and other problems remain unresolved.'
IV.

THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF STUDENTS

FOR A SECTION

601

VIOLATION

As amicus curiae, the New Mexico State Board of Education
asked if a decision favorable to the plaintiffs would require bilingual education whenever there was one student in a school district who did not speak English. Relying on Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau,50 the court of appeals attempted to dispel the spectre of impending financial doom raised
by the State: "[O]nly when a substantial group is being deprived of a meaningful education will a Title VI violation exist."',
What constitutes a "substantial group"? Lau involved 1,800
Chinese students in a school district of approximately 100,000
11Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 8, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955, 4956 (1968).
' 499 F.2d at 1154.
"[SItudents receiving instruction will spend maximum time with other children
so as to avoid isolation and segregation from their peers." ASPIRA of N.Y., Inc. v. Board
of Educ., Civil No. 72-4002 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1974).
, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Finally, there is the problem of properly defining the group discriminated against.
Classification by surname is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of the disadvantaged
group. Some Spanish speaking persons have non-Spanish surnames. And many Spanish
surnamed persons are not English language deficient. Classification solely on the basis of
surname, as in Serna, is not precise. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN

IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH

414 U.S. at 572.
499 F.2d at 1154.

1972

AND 1971

at 5-6 (1973).
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students." Plaintiffs in Serna accounted for 26 percent of the
district's enrollment. Neither case mentions any more on this
subject but that these numbers are sufficient for a section 601
violation.
HEW's May 25th Memorandum was distributed to school
districts with 5 percent or more minority students.53 Five percent
might, then, be one standard for identifying a "substantial
group." Plaintiffs would not have prevailed in Lau, however,
under such a standard.
Alaska and Massachusetts have mandatory bilingual education statutes that appear to offer more useful standards in this
respect. In Massachusetts any school district with 20 or more
students speaking a single language, other than English, must
offer bilingual-bicultural education. A similar requirement is
imposed by the Alaska statute for any one school with 15 or more
such students." The thrust of both statutes is to provide
bilingual-bicultural education when there are enough students to
justify the cost of hiring a bilingual teacher and the acquisition
of bilingual education material. 56
This standard, or one closely approximating it, should satisfy
the "substantial group" threshold. Contrary arguments urging a
higher threshold should bear a very heavy burden of persuasion."
V.

CONCLUSION

In Lau the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a statutory right to bilingual education. The appropriate remedy for
" Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1973).
" U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD QUALrrY EDUCATION FOR MEXICAN AMERICANS: MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY, REPORT VI at 50 (1974).

11Transitional Bilingual Education Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A, §§ 1-9
(Supp. 1974). See also for a model act with comments based on the Massachusetts statute,
Kobrick, A Model Act Providingfor TransitionalBilingual EducationProgramsin Public
Schools, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 260 (1972).
0 ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 14.08.160 to .170 (Supp. 1974). The Alaska statute is less well
suited for most states in that many Alaskan Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts live in communities with only one school. The Alaska statute meets this need. Both Serna and Lau
consider this problem, however, in terms of the number of such students in a school
district.
1 The added costs of such a program can, in part, be offset by federal aid. Bilingual
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970), as amended, Act of August 21, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-380, § 105, 88 Stat. 484.
1, A related problem involves the availability of bilingual teachers. If there are not
enough such teachers to meet the need in a state, then it might be proper to urge the state
teacher certification authority to require bilingual training as an element of teacher certification.
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a violation of that right was not there determined. The significance of the Serna decision for courts and school districts alike is
that it provides a beginning for consideration of that problem.
Michael P. O'Connell

III. EQUAL PROTECTION-ABORTIONS
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974)
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
Paul S. Rose, Executive Director of the Utah State Department of Social Services, established an informal policy which
proscribed expenditure of Medicaid funds for abortions unless the
abortion was "therapeutic," which he defined as "one necessary
to save the life of the expectant mother or to prevent serious and
permanent impairment to her physical health, and none other."'
Although this policy was not reduced to writing, it was strictly
followed. Jane Doe, Jane Roe, and Jane Poe each sought an abortion at the University of Utah Hospital. Although all were eligible
for categorical assistance under Medicaid and each proposed
abortion was approved as medically appropriate by the hospital
staff, the staff was aware of Rose's policy, which would have
prevented reimbursement. The women brought a class action
against Rose, seeking a declaration that his policy was illegal and
an injunction preventing its enforcement. At the time suit was
brought, two of the women were in their second trimester of pregnancy and one was in her first.
The trial court temporarily enjoined the enforcement of
Rose's policy and the women underwent abortions. Subsequently,
the parties agreed to a stipulation of the facts, and both moved
for summary judgment based upon the stipulation. The plaintiffs' motion was granted and the defendant's denied, the trial
court finding that each plaintiff had a constitutionally protected
right to an abortion, and that the plaintiffs would be denied equal
protection of the laws if the defendant were allowed to discriminate between "therapeutic" and "non-therapeutic" abortions. In
addition, the trial court found that the defendant was without
statutory authority to deny "non-therapeutic" abortions. 2 Rose
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1113 (10th Cir. 1974).
This finding was based primarily upon the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396a(a)(10), (13) (1974) and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396d(a)(1), (5) (1974).
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was permanently enjoined from conditioning payment upon his
prior approval and from restricting payment to "therapeutic"
abortions.
Rose appealed, arguing that the right to welfare was solely a
statutory right and that, since no statute had been violated, no
constitutional issue had been raised. He maintained that even if
the issue did involve a constitutional question, a state may select
the type of medical services for which it desires matching federal
funds as long as it does so on a rational basis. A limited state
budget and the incentive for proper birth control methods were
cited as the state's rationale. 3 Rose considered an abortion to be
medically "non-necessary" in the same sense that cosmetic surgery is not medically required.4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the
trial court's decision. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court prefers
a statutory rather than a constitutional resolution of welfare controversies, 5 the Tenth Circuit nevertheless disposed of the case on
constitutional grounds, prefering not to make a strained interpretation of the applicable state and federal statutes which were
silent as to abortion. Rather, the court found that the policy was
neither mandated nor prohibited by statute.
With respect to the constitutional issue the court noted that,
although a state need not choose to participate in a federal welfare program, if it does elect to do so it must act consistently with
federal statutes and regulations.' Any program, however funded,
must conform to the requirements of the Constitution.7 At the
same time, a welfare regulation "which is 'rationally based and
free from invidious discrimination' will not offend the Constitution and is to be given effect." ' The Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Roe v. Wade' and its companion case of Doe v.
Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id.
I at 8-9.
Wyman v. Rothstein, 398 U.S. 275 (1970).
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
499 F.2d at 1115.
410 U.S. 113 (1973), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959. The basic principles of Roe v.
Wade are that in the first trimester of pregnancy the abortion decision must be left
entirely to the pregnant woman and her attending physician. After the first trimester, the
state may regulate abortion to the extent that the regulations are reasonably related to
maternal health. After viability (24th to 28th week) the state's interest in protecting the
fetus becomes compelling and abortion may be regulated or proscribed, except where it
is medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65. The
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Bolton 10 established that the constitutional right of privacy includes a qualified right to elect an abortion." Any regulation of
this "fundamental right" requires that a "compelling state interest" be demonstrated." In Doe v. Rose the state could not claim
such an interest because Memorial Hospitalv. MaricopaCounty 3
had demonstrated that conservation of the taxpayers' purse is not
sufficient to meet the "compelling state interest" standard. 4
The court found support for its decision in the analagous
cases of Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital 5 and Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center." In Hathaway, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that consensual sterilization involved a
fundamental right and that consequently a city hospital must
demonstrate a compelling rationale in order to prohibit that operation while permitting other procedures of no greater risk or demand on staff. In Klein, a three-judge court held that a policy
limiting the use of Medicaid funds to therapeutic abortions performed within the initial 24 weeks of pregnancy denied indigent
women equal protection of the laws. If the state were to pay for
Supreme Court's decision in this case was greeted with both enthusiasm and criticism.
For discussions of the decision, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Processand
the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1974); Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The
Right of Privacy Revisited, 21 KAN. L. Rzv. 527 (1973); Comment, In Defense of Liberty:
A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1973); Note, Implications of the
Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigationand Legislation, 74 COLum. L. REv. 237
(1974).
o 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
* The Constitution does not expressly mention the right of privacy. Past decisions,
however, have made it clear that personal rights which are "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" are protected by the Constitution. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973). For the classic development of the right of privacy, see Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a case involving contraception. The right has also been recognized in the following areas: Contraception- Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Activities relating to marriage-Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Procreation-Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Child rearing
and education-Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Roe v. Wade extends this
right to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
1 410 U.S. at 155.
" 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
' Even if the more lenient "rational basis" test were used, conservation of the taxpayers' purse would not justify the denial of abortions to indigents because the state would
then face the more expensive alternative of providing the medical care associated with
childbirth. See, e.g., Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 501
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
" 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in
Klein and remanded for reconsideration in light of Wade and Bolton, 412 U.S. 925 (1973),
but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the case was still viable. 499 F.2d at 1116
n.3.
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the expenses of full-term delivery, but not for the cost of an abortion, an indigent would have no choice but to bear the child, while
someone financially independent would have either alternative.
In Doe v.Rampton,'7 a Utah statute prohibiting, inter alia, the
use of state funds for non-therapeutic abortions was invalidated
because it would limit the exercise of the right to an abortion in
all trimesters, for reasons having no apparent connection with the
health of the mother or child. In the instant case, the court reasoned that if such a statute was invalid, an informal policy to the
same effect must also be invalid.' 8
II. OTHER ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT ABORTIONS
Undoubtedly the court's decision will be unpopular with the
70 percent of Utah's population who are of the Mormon faith"
and oppose abortion on moral grounds.20 Anti-abortion sentiment
is not limited to Utah, however, and efforts have been made
throughout the nation to restrict or discourage abortions. For
example, family members have interfered with a woman's decision to obtain an abortion. Hospitals have refused to perform the
operation, and legislation has been passed in an attempt to make
abortions difficult or impossible to obtain.
A.

Family Members-Consent by the Father of Child or by
Parents of Minor Mother
When deciding Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court found it

366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
Although the court did not feel it necessary to deal with Rose's contention that an
abortion is a "non-necessary" medical procedure, plaintiffs' attorney relied upon Klein v.
Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), to show that the
condition of pregnancy does require medical treatment, whether by abortion or by the care
associated with childbirth. Brief for Appellees at 12, Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.
1974). In Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), the court ruled invalid a state
regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department which conditioned Medicaid payments
upon medical certification by the attending physician and the Chief of Obstetrics and
Gynecology in accredited hospitals that the "abortion is recommended as medically or
psychiatrically necessary .... " Id. at 727 n.1. The Norton court concluded that:
While the constitutional right to have an abortion does not necessarily carry
with it a constitutional right to a free abortion, a statute that provides
payment to the needy for medical expenses would encounter constitutional
obstacles if it were construed to weight the choice of a pregnant woman
against electing the abortion that is her constitutional right to choose. Government is not required by the Constitution to pay for any medical service,
but once it decides to provide payments, it must not unduly disadvantage
those who exercise a constitutional right.
Id. at 730.
" 27 ENCYCLOPE=IA AMmuCANA 833 (Int'l ed. 1972).
0 See, e.g., 9 THE PRIESTHOOD BuLLEIN, no. 1, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints (Feb. 1973).
'
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unnecessary to determine what rights, if any, parents and husbands might have in the abortion decision. 2 Other courts have,
therefore, been confronted with that determination. In Coe v.
Gerstein 2 the court reasoned that because the state cannot interfere, until the compelling point, with the mother's right of privacy
even to protect the fetus' right to life, it could not interfere on
behalf of the husband's or parents' interest in the fetus. Likewise,
since it cannot interfere to protect the mother's health until the
second trimester, it cannot do so to protect another's interest in
her health. In other words, the state ought not be able to delegate
to others a power which it cannot itself exercise. Coe did not
negate the possibility that a statute might be written which
would distinguish a third party's interests from those of maternal
health and potential life, but it seems unlikely that third party
interests could outweigh the fundamental right of privacy which
is the basis of a woman's right to choose abortion. In Doe. v.
Rampton 23 the District Court for the District of Utah invalidated
a section of the Utah statutes which required the pre-abortion
consent of the father or parents-depending upon the mother's
marital status-on the grounds that such a requirement subjected the exercise of the individual right of privacy to consent of
others in all stages of pregnancy. It appears that the Tenth Circuit is in agreement with other circuits when protecting a
woman's right of election from infringement by family members. 2
B.

Hospitals-Publicand Private

It is clear that public hospitals must provide facilities for
abortions,2 and that private or denominational hospitals may
refuse to do so.26 The distinction between a public and private
410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See also Note, The Right of a Husband or a
Minor's Parent to Participatein the Abortion Decision, 28 U. Mmi L. REv. 251 (1973).
23 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
2,In Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974), a mother was allowed to abort without
her husband's approval. In Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974), an unmarried putative father was unable to enjoin an abortion. See also Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. Rv. 305 (1974).
21 Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) established that
the issue of consensual sterilization involved a fundamental right and could not be prohibited by a hospital when other procedures of similar complication were allowed. On the
strength of Hathaway, it was ruled in Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932 (D.
Minn. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), that a municipal hospital was obliged
to allow abortions and to provide facilities for those who wished to perform them. Accord,
Doe v. Hale Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 970 (D. Mass.), afl'd, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974).
" Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973).
",

2
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hospital is not so clear. Factors such as the availability of other
hospitals in the area which provide abortion facilities, tax benefits given to hospitals, and the receipt of federal funds such as
those provided by the Hill-Burton Act" might influence a court
in determining whether a given hospital is operating under the
color of state law, and therefore subject to the restrictions of the
fourteenth amendment. 8 At the same time, no single factor is
likely to be controlling, and it appears that courts will continue
to decide each case on an individual basis unless more definite
guidelines are furnished by the Supreme Court.
C.

Legislation-Stateand Federal

State legislatures have attempted to restrict abortions by
defining the point at which viability occurs," by limiting the
advertisement of abortions, 30 and by placing burdensome reporting or procedural requirements on the operation.3 ' Few of these
attempts have been successful when tested in court."2 A Utah
statute effective April 4, 1974, requires, inter alia, that the physician give prior notice to the mother's husband or parents, if possible. 33 It also requires that the mother be informed of adoption
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
n In Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973), it was ruled that
the receipt of Hill-Burton funds does not force a private hospital to permit abortions, but
in Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974), a case
involving a physician's right to hospital privileges, the court ruled that the receipt of such
funds did subject the hospital to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Earlier
racial segregation cases also demonstrated a willingness to construe a hospital's activities
as being under the color of state action. See, e.g., Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir.
1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). But see
Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2406 (1974);
Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
" Associated Students v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Doe v.
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D.
Okla. 1973).
1, Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp.
1008 (D. Minn. 1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); State v. Jacobus,
75 Misc. 2d 840, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But see Friendship Medical Center,
Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 367 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
n See notes 29-31 supra. An interesting exception is Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213
Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). Here a physician was convicted for violating a statute
prohibiting the advertisement of abortions. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). Upon
reconsideration, the Virginia court found nothing in Roe and Doe to prohibit the regulation of commercial advertising in the medical-health field and affirmed the conviction.
214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). Recently the Supreme Court has noted probable
jurisdiction and may rule on the matter. Bigelow v. Virginia, 43 U.S.L.W. 3068 (U.S. Aug.
13, 1974) (No. 73-1309).
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Supp. 1973).
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services available and of the details of the abortion procedure
itself,34 as well as requiring the doctor to complete a lengthy report.3 5 It is not unlikely that some of these provisions will be
tested in Tenth Circuit courts."
The U.S. Senate recently amended an appropriations bill to
proscribe the use of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare funds for abortions. 7 If this measure becomes law, it could
effect a substantial change in abortion law, but would first undoubtedly face a severe constitutional test in light of the Supreme
38
Court's firm position on abortion.
III. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, there have
been many attempts to restrict its application. The Court's ruling
was clear, however, and the lower courts have been consistent in
upholding the right of a woman and her physician to make the
abortion decision without undue state interference. Doe v. Rose
lends the strength and prestige of a U.S. Court of Appeals decision to the mounting volume of case law supporting that right.
In this case the indigent woman's right to choose between bearing
a child and obtaining an abortion, without overwhelming financial pressure in favor of the state's preferred choice, was protected.
Dennis E. House
"
Supp.

Id. § 76-7-305.
Id. § 76-7-315.
Compare these restrictions to those invalidated in Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F.
1008 (D. Minn. 1974).
31 S. amend. 1859, 120 Cong. Rec. 16832 (1974), amending H.R. 15580, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974):
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act ["Departments of
Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1975"] shall
be used in any manner directly or indirectly to pay for or encourage the
performances of abortions except such abortions as are necessary to save the
life of a mother.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court stated that although
Congress may enact legislation which is necessary and appropriate to enforce the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, it may not dilute those
rights. It has been said that equal protection does apply to welfare rights. Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX DISCRIMINATION
Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974)
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States
Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Tenth Circuit considered two cases involving sex discrimination and the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. In one the court found that state law denied to women
the same substantive tort rights afforded to men. In the second,
the court held that the systematic policy of excluding women
from membership in a charitable service organization did not
violate the fourteenth amendment.
In Duncan v. General Motors Corp.,' the husband of the
plaintiff was seriously injured and permanently disabled when
the car which he was driving collided with a truck tractor on an
Oklahoma highway. Suit against the manufacturer of the automobile was instituted to recover damages for an alleged breach
of implied warranty of fitness for a defectively manufactured
braking system and to recover for loss of the husband's consortium.
Although the wife argued that the married women's rights
act of Oklahoma,' which had been adopted between the accident
and the commencement of the suit and which allowed wives to
recover, should govern procedural matters and ought to be applied retroactively, 3 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma disagreed and dismissed the action, finding that the pre-act common law which denied wives the
right to sue for loss of consortium was conclusive of the plaintiff's
substantive rights.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, joining a growing
number of jurisdictions which have judicially extended to women
the right to recover for loss of consortium.' Judge Hill, writing for
the majority, found that:
499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15 (Supp. 1974).
499 F.2d at 836-37.
Suit was instituted on April 23, 1973; the amendment to the women's rights act
allowing wives to sue for loss of consortium became effective April 27, 1973. Before the
amendment, the common law denied a wife the right to recover for loss of consortium. Id.
at 835-36.
, A wife's right to recover for loss of consortium was recognized in Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Since then, the right has been acknowledged by court
decisions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971).
I
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[W]here state law is challenged for federal constitutional reasons,
as it is here, federal law governs and not state substantive law ....
We are therefore not bound to adhere to Oklahoma law if we determine it to be unconstitutional.'

The court concluded that the Oklahoma law offended not
only the test of "patently arbitrary"7 and invidious discrimination under decisions like Reed v. Reed, s but the court also believed that it offended the position taken by four Justices in
Frontierov. Richardson'that classifications based upon sex ought
to be subject to more searching judicial scrutiny. 10
The second significant decision handed down by the Tenth
Circuit during the past year was Junior Chamber of Commerce
of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees," an action arising
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 2 The Junior Chamber
of Commerce of Rochester, New York, and its individual members were joined by other chapters of the national organization
and their individual members in this action against the United
States Jaycees and several federal officials. The plaintiffs alleged
that the United States Jaycees, in excluding women from membership in any Jaycees organization, had violated the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution in
wrongfully depriving plaintiffs of membership." The bylaws of
the United States Jaycees restrict membership to males. The
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester had previously admitted women as members and was thereupon expelled from the
United States Jaycees. Individual members of the Rochester
chapter were denied affiliation with the national organization and
were thereby denied the opportunity to participate in programs
which included utilization of federal funds. The plaintiffs noted
that the United States Jaycees and its chapters received tax ben499 F.2d at 837-38 (citations omitted).

Id. at 838.

'

"

404 U.S. 71 (1971).
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
499 F.2d at 838.
495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
495 F.2d at 884.
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efits and federal grants and contracts," and they noted that in
some cases federal funds were awarded to state agencies which in
turn made grants to the local Jaycees for use in their projects.' 5
Federal officers were named as defendants on the grounds that
the granting of tax exemptions and federal funds to a group which
discriminates was improper. Judge Doyle, writing for the majority, noted that a "memorandum admitted into evidence showed
that government funds distributed by the United States Jaycees
amounted to approximately $985,000."' This sum accounted "for
almost forty per cent of the national budget"" of the national
organization.
The district court ruled that the federal question was so insubstantial as to fail to state a claim, noting that no direct relationship between the discriminatory membership policy and the
distribution of government funds was alleged.' 8 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs were excluded from
membership purely on the basis of sex and that state or federal
discrimination on that basis was improper." But the court found
no official action under section 1983 to warrant invocation of the
fourteenth amendment's protection. In ruling for the defendants,
the United States Jaycees, the court held:
The Constitution applies if the private action complained of is in
essence the action of the government . . .. [Pllaintiffs say that
the state must, consistent with the Constitution, refrain from dealing with discriminators regardless of whether the discrimination is
related to the alleged state action. We disagree."0

In failing to find the requisite state action, the court considered the decisions in Moose Lodge v. Irvis2' and in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority." In Moose Lodge, the Supreme
Court held that the state's grant of a liquor license and its concomitant regulation were not sufficient to implicate the state in
the racially discriminatory guest policies of the Lodge and specifi" Id. The tax benefits are conferred by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 170 &
501. Section 170 deals with allowances of deduction for charitable contributions, and
section 501 treats exemption from taxation for qualifying organizations.
495 F.2d at 886-87.
Id. at 884.
7 Brief for Appellants at 18, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974).
495 F.2d at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
21

Id. at 887.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).

365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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cally held that "[h]owever detailed this type of regulation may
be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or
encourage racial discrimination."2 The Tenth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that "there must be a sufficient nexus between the
discrimination and the alleged state action in order to render the
activity a constitutional violation."2 In Burton a private restaurant which practiced racial discrimination was leased from a municipal parking authority and was operated adjacent to a public
parking lot for the convenience of the public. There the Supreme
Court found the requisite state action, but the Court cautioned
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.""
Two important Tenth Circuit precedents upon which the
5 and Browns v.
court relied were Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital"
Mitchell" in which the "court [had] adopted a more restricted
view of what is state action. ' 28 In Ward the Tenth Circuit held
that a small percentage of governmental funding for a hospital
did not subject the hospital to a civil rights action since "the facts
failed to establish that the State of Colorado had any part in the
alleged deprivation." The court held in Browns that policies of
private organizations do not furnish the requisite state action
even though such organizations receive tax benefits. While the
granting of government funds or the granting of tax exemptions
alone in these cases fails to transform the acts of a private organization into acts under color of state law, similar situations have
been dealt with differently in other circuits. °
In the Jaycees case, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with
the lack of nexus, i.e., the absence of a connection between the
state action and the alleged deprivation. The fact of exemption
407 U.S. at 176-77.
z 495 F.2d at 888.
365 U.S. at 722.
476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973).
409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
n 495 F.2d at 887.
v Id.
3 In McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971), the court found that eviction
from a housing facility on land purchased from a city redevelopment authority was state
action because the government retained the right to oversee administration of the property. However, in Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973), an
attempt at summary eviction from a privately owned and operated apartment house was
held not to be state action although the house was federally financed and was consequently taxed at a lesser rate than similar buildings not so funded.
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from federal taxation did not furnish the requisite nexus. Similarly, a landowner in Walz v. Tax Commission' sought to enjoin
the New York City Tax Commission from granting exemptions to
religious organizations on the ground that such exemptions violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. Chief Justice Burger declared:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church support the state....
There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and the establishment of religion.3 "

However, the increasing importance of tax exemptions in an
overall scheme of governmental involvement in private activity
is becoming more pronounced. 3 More recent attitudes toward tax
exemptions bode ill for a summary treatment of the issue and
suggest that the explanation that "we're not giving, we're simply
not taking away" has fewer adherents than it has enjoyed in the
past."
Governmental grants-in-aid and governmental contracts
have, at times, been found to furnish the appropriate nexus:
The allocation of government aid to a private activity is another
type of state involvement which invariably constitutes state support
of the challenged activity. However, aid is distinct from a powergrant in that it merely supports private parties in the exercise of
rights they would possess absent the aid; powers behind such activities do not derive solely from government. Such state involvement
is, therefore, somewhat less efficaciously supportive of a putative
infringement than are power grants. Nonetheless, private parties
should not be allowed to use government resources in ways that
would be unconstitutional for the state itself. u

The very real question is whether the government should be the
insurer of the "goodness" of its beneficiaries. In the Jaycees
31397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 676.
See Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972);
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts v. Department of Revenue,
333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970)
(preliminary injunction), on final injunction sub nom. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). But
see McCoy v. Schultz, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 858 (D.D.C. 1973).
u Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972). See generally Comment, Tax Incentives As State
Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414 (1973).
3 Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 672 (1974).
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case, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the
state must refrain from dealing with discriminators whether or
not the discrimination relates to the alleged state action.3
In our case ...

the question is whether the United States is obli-

gated to see to it that the United States Jaycees' conduct shall be
exemplary quite apart from its administering of programs and governmental funds. No case has been cited which extends to this
length.37

The plaintiffs argued that it should not be unreasonable to
ask the government to require that the very structure of an aspiring governmental beneficiary not include discrimination:
An incidental financial contribution to a private institution may not
necessarily approve of a specific procedure or policy in a particular
situation of which the government was not even aware at the time
assistance was given. To hold that the state is responsible for every
such improper procedure would require daily supervision of each
institution receiving funds. This is not the case where there is an
established policy of discrimination which is a well known characteristic of the institution.u

Notwithstanding the large percentage of federal money in the
organization's budget 39 and the favorable tax treatment received
by the Jaycees, the Tenth Circuit found an absence of nexus
between the governmental action and the declared national policy of the Junior Chamber of Commerce to admit only males to
membership. The facts and circumstances of each similar case
are of critical importance and the balance may shift as the facts
and the circumstances seem different to the courts.
Laura Vogelgesang
" See text accompanying note 20, supra.
" 495 F.2d at 888.

" Brief for Appellants at 36, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v.
United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
11Brief for Federal Appellees at 9, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc.
v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974): "Applicants for sponsorship of
the federal projects must demonstrate that they are truly nonprofit, and that they are
capable of successfully developing the program; the membership policies of sponsoring
groups are not the object of inquiry." There is no nexus here, but the result of Pitts v.
Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 670 (E.D. Wis. 1971) was an order to "impose
upon the defendants the duty of questioning organizations claiming an exemption about
whether their constitutions, by-laws or actual practices require discrimination in membership ..
"
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V. ZONING-NONCONFORMING USES
A. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118
(10th Cir. 1973)
In 1971, the City and County of Denver amended its zoning
ordinance to restrict the types of advertising and display signs
that could be located in certain zoning districts. Nonconforming
signs, presently located in those areas, were to be eliminated over
a period of from 2 to 5 years, depending upon the replacement
cost of the sign. Those with higher replacement costs were given
a longer period of time.' In addition, flashing, fluctuating, animated, or portable signs were allowed 30 days to comply with the
ordinance irrespective of their cost.'
The constitutional validity of that amendment to the zoning
ordinance was challenged in Art Neon Co. v. City and County of
Denver.3 The action was brought by companies engaged in the
installation, sale, and lease of signs and advertising displays and
by retail businesses who owned or leased signs. Plaintiffs contended that the "Permitted Signs" section violated article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution (an impairment of contracts); the fifth amendment (a taking of private property without just compensation); the first amendment (a restriction on
freedom of expression); and the fourteenth amendment (a denial
of equal protection and of due process).'
The district court considered whether the termination procedures prescribed by the ordinance were a valid exercise of the
police power or whether they were a taking of private property
without just compensation. The trial court held that the sign
ordinance "[d]id not provide for the payment of just compensaDENvER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE § 613 (1971).
§ 613.5-5(4) [Termination of Non-Conforming Signs] BY Amortization.
The right to maintain a non-conforming sign shall terminate in accordance with the following schedule:
Shall be terminated within the
Any sign which on the date the
following period after the sign
sign became non-conforming
would cost the following amount
became non-conforming:
to replace:
$0 to $3,000 ........................................... 2 years
3,001 to 6,000 .......................................... 3 years
6,001 to 15,000 ......................................... 4 years
15,001 or m ore .........................................

Id. § 613.5-5(4)(a).
488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.) rev'g 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973).
488 F.2d at 120.

5 years
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tion" 5 and that, therefore, the ordinance violated the fifth amendment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and found the sign
ordinance to be a proper exercise of the police power. However,
the court concluded that the so-called "amortization" periods
based on the replacement cost of the signs were unreasonable and
held valid only the 5-year period for elimination of the nonconforming signs.
The problem of the nonconforming use has been characterized as one of the fundamental problems facing zoning decisions.'
"A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective
date of the zoning restriction and continuing since that time in
nonconformance to the ordinance." 7 Nonconforming uses generally are not allowed to be enlarged, expanded, or altered; neither
may the use be resumed after abandonment or destruction.
Methods most commonly employed to terminate uses include:
exercising the power of eminent domain; allowing the use to
wither away; restricting expansion, repair, and resumption of use;
monetary inducements to move; and amortization.8 All but the
last have been accepted by the courts, and all but the last are
generally ineffective.'
Amortization is a technical term used to describe a period
over which an owner may depreciate his investment.10 The Den'

357 F. Supp. at 481.
' In Wasinger v. Miller, 154 Colo. 61, 66, 388 P.2d 250, 253 (1964), the court stated:
"In fact, non-conforming uses represent conditions which should be reduced to conformity
as speedily as is compatible with justice." And in Grant v. Mayor & City Council, 212
Md. 301, 302, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957) the court found that:
Nonconforming uses have not disappeared. . . because the general regulation of future uses and changes . . . have put the latter in an intrenched
position often with a value that is great-and grows-because of the artificial
monopoly given it by the law. Indeed, there is general agreement that the
fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability to eliminate the nonconforming use.
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 453, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (1954).
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968); Note, Zoning: Amortization of Nonconforming
Uses for Aesthetic Purposes, 39 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 179 (1971).
Note, supra note 8.
" Four cases involving amortization ordinances have been appealed to the Supreme
Court, but all have been denied: Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970);
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280
U.S. 556 (1929); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), appeal
dismissed. 411 U.S. 901 (1973).
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ver sign ordinance referred to the graduated periods for termination dependent upon sign cost as a method of amortization.
[Blut in reality it is no more than notice to the owner and user of
the sign that they have a period of time to make whatever adjustments or other arrangements they can. This is probably not a proper
use of the word "amortization," and so used it contains no connotation of compensation or a requirement therefor."

In determining the constitutionality of amortization ordinances, courts look to the reasonableness of the ordinance and of
the period for termination which are generally ascertained by
balancing the public gain against the private harm. For example,
in Harbison v. City of Buffalo 2 the New York Court of Appeals
held that these factors were to be considered in terminating nonconforming uses: the nature of the surrounding neighborhood, the
value and the condition of any improvements, the nearest relocation area, the cost of relocation, and any other costs which would
place a burden on the property owner. In City of Los Angeles v.
Gage the court said:
The distinction between an ordinance restricting future uses
and one requiring the termination of present uses within a reasonable period of time is merely one degree, and constitutionality depends on the relative importance to be given to the public gain and
to the private loss."

The factors to which the Gage court looked in considering the
reasonableness of the ordinance included: was the owner allowed
time to make plans to offset at least partially his losses, was the
loss extended over a period of years, and did the owner enjoy a
monopolistic position as long as he was allowed to remain?
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka 5 the court looked to the value of the property interest at
the end of the period or, in the alternative, to the value of the
freedom from new competition for the statutory period to determine if it equalled the value of the property interest then remaining at the end of the period. 6
1 488 F.2d at 121.
12 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
'= 127 Cal. App. 2d 538, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
Id. at 460, 274 P.2d at 44.
281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
" Where the issue is decided by balancing the public good and the private harm, it
is common for the court to grant the ordinance a presumption of validity, place the burden
on the other party to show that it is not reasonable, and resolve whether that burden was
met by looking to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Standard Oil Co. v.
"
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In Art Neon Co. the court observed that the legislative determination to terminate nonconforming uses is reached by balancing the burden placed on the individual against the public good
to be gained." Such a determination has a presumption of validity and "must only meet the test of 'reasonableness,' that is, the
plan for termination must be 'reasonable.' "s The factors to
which the court looked to verify the reasonableness of the ordinance included: the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the structure, the location, the part of the individual's total
business affected, salvage value, depreciation for income tax and
other purposes, and any monopolistic advantage resulting from
similar new structures being prohibited in the same area." Applying these factors to the Denver ordinance, the court concluded
that it was "basically reasonable. 2 0 Unlike the ordinance in
Naegele v. Minnetonka, the Tenth Circuit held it not necessary
that "the nonconforming property concerned have no value at the
2
termination date."
The period for termination of flashing signs was found to be
reasonable. The fact that their effectiveness was greatly reduced
was balanced by the extreme character of the signs and their
relation to the public safety. But the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the different "amortization" categories for other signs having
different replacement costs were unreasonable:
The replacement cost of the signs is not related to any of the relevant
factors in the reasonableness tests, and presents no valid basis for
different treatment of different signs ranging from three to five
years. It has no bearing on the landowner's problems, nor on the sign
owner's situation nor on the city's position. The most that can be
said for replacement cost is that it could indicate, as of the date
used, the size or complexity of the sign, but this is no real help.
When the categories so constructed are removed, we are left with the
City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); National Advertising Co. v. County of
Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962); Board of Supervisors v. Miller,
170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.
1972); City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959). Other cases have
taken into account the size of the investment involved, Village of Larchmont v. Sutton,
30 Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1961), and have looked to the Internal
Revenue Service amortization rules to gauge the reasonableness of the time period, National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1970).
11488 F.2d at 121.
I/d.

Id. at 122.
2Id.
21

Id. at 121.
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five-year maximum period for removal of all nonconforming signs in
the ordinance, and this period ...

is a valid one."

The Tenth Circuit found that the sign ordinance did not
constitute a taking of private property without just compensation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 Mr. Justice Holmes
observed "that while property may be regulated to a certain ex2' 4
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
The difference between a valid regulation and a taking is one of
degree and not of kind, and is decided by balancing the loss to
the individual property owner against the value of the regulation
to the public.25
In his dissent to Pennsylvania Coal, Mr. Justice Brandeis
argued that the difference should be one of kind and not of degree.
For the police power to be valid, it must be grounded upon a
rational basis for a valid public purpose and it must be an appropriate means to achieve a public goal. In Brandeis' view, the
validity of the regulation under the due process clause should be
based on the nature of the public purposes to be served and on
the existence of a reasonable basis for the regulation. In contrast,
Holmes based the validity on the amount of injury done to the
individual. 2 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian27 the Court said that
while the police power may "seem harsh in its exercise

. . .

the

Id. at 122.
- 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21 Id. at 415.
21 Justice Holmes' opinion has been strongly criticized. See Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Stever, Land Use Controls, Takings,
2

and the Police Power-A Discussion of the Myth, 15 N.H.B.J. 149 (1974). However, one
of the leading cases finding an amortization ordinance unreasonable, Hoffman v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965), relied on language from Pennsylvania Coal in support of its
decision. In this case the ordinance required all land used for open storage to be discontinued within 6 years. The court followed the dissent in Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958), holding that the ordinance constituted a
taking without just compensation and quoted from Pennsylvania Coal:

We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.
260 U.S. at 416. The Hoffman decision has been criticized for its narrow view of the police
power. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967);
Note, Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Terminationof Nonconforming Uses, 45 NEB. L.

REV. 636 (1966); Note, Zoning-Amortization Technique for Eliminating Nonconforming
Uses Constitutes Taking of Private Propertyfor Public Use Without Just Compensation,
44 TExAs L. REv. 368 (1965); Note, Zoning-Nonconforming Uses-Amortization Theory
of Abatement of Nonconforming Uses Violates Missouri Constitution, 11 ViL. L. R'v. 189
(1965).
" See Stever, supra note 25.
- 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation
upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. ' 28
The Tenth Circuit noted that the sign restrictions were an
integral part of the "aim or purpose of zoning," which in itself
has been recognized as a valid exercise of the police power.3 Of
particular importance to the court was the fact that the sign
ordinance "[d]id not prohibit the use of signs, but require[d]
conformance to specified types in specified places." 31 Since the
regulation did not absolutely prohibit advertising displays, it was
not a taking without just compensation. "It [was] of general
application under a plan adjusted to different conditions in each
zone, and not directed to particular tracts or signs. It [was] a
3' 2
bona fide use restriction.
Lawrence R. Kueter
B.

C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974)
In 1965, plaintiff-appellant was issued a building permit for
the construction of condominium units. A short time thereafter,
the intended use was made nonconforming by an amendment to
the zoning regulations of Pitkin County, Colorado. With less than
a fifth of the proposed units completed, financial difficulties arose
which required appellant to cease construction in 1966. The
building inspector denied appellant's application for a new building permit to resume construction in 1971 because the original
permit had expired and the condominium units were nonconforming. On appeal the board of adjustment affirmed the denial.
Appellant sought a declaratory judgment and damages or an injunction in the federal district court. The trial court rendered
judgment for appellee finding that appellant had abandoned the
project.
In affirming, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the doctrine of relation back effecting a revalidation of the original building permit was not within the contemplation of section
n Id. at 410.

n 488 F.2d at 123.
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11488 F.2d at 123.
n Id.
3

C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974).
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302(d) of the Uniform Building Code dealing with expired building permits. 34 The court found that any new building permit necessitated by expiration of the old permit was subject to current
zoning regulations.3
In answer to appellant's argument that there must exist intent to abandon, the court distinguished between ordinances such
as the Pitkin County zoning regulation which predicated abandonment of a nonconforming use on the discontinuance of a use
for a stated period of time, and those which failed to specify a
is unnecessary; in
time limit. In the former, the finding of intent
36
element.
essential
an
is
the latter, intent
Even though appellant was deprived of all reasonable use of
his undeveloped land because he had originally and voluntarily
recorded a condominium declaration, this did not constitute a
taking under the due process and just compensation clauses of the
state and federal constitutions. 3 The court reiterated the general
principle that a "landowner cannot create his own hardship and
then require that zoning regulations be changed to meet that
hardship. '3 Similarly, the court found that equitable estoppel
did not arise when appellant's acts contributed to his adverse
39
condition.

VI. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973)
Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974)
In recent years the courts have been called upon to review an
increasing number of conscientious objector cases which arise in
the military.' With the termination of the draft and the move to
a volunteer army, conscientious objection is now limited to a class
of persons who are presently serving in the armed services. To
qualify as an inservice conscientious objector, one must prove
that his beliefs surfaced due to some known or unknown incident
" Id. at 837.
5Id.
"Id.
' Id. at 838.
"Id.
Id.
Zillman, In-Service Conscientious Objection: Courts, Boards and the Basis in Fact,
SAN
DiEo L. REV. 108, 110 n.7 (1972).
10
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while he was in the military, i.e., his views must have "crystal-

lized."'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed two Air Force conscientious
objector cases, Smith v. Laird3 and Cole v. Clements' during the
past year. These inservice claims, as are all other inservice conscientious objector claims, were processed pursuant to Department
of Defense Directive No. 1300.65 and its implementing service
regulations. Since these cases arose in the Air Force, the procedures for conscientious objector discharge were provided by Air
Force Regulation 35-24. Pursuant to these regulations, both Captain (Doctor) Smith and Airman Cole applied to their respective
commanders and alleged the required "crystallization" for discharge After application, each serviceman was interviewed by a
I See Polsky v. Wetherill, 455 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1972) for what has been
described as a classic example of "crystallization" after entering military service.
486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973).
494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974).
32 C.F.R. § 75 (1974). See Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 15, 31 (1972).
32 C.F.R. § 888e (1974). Pursuant to this regulation, an applicant must meet three
tests to establish a prima facie case of conscientious objection. He must: (1) be opposed
to war in any form; (2) ground his objection on religious principles as enunciated in Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
and (3) be sincere in his beliefs. This test is mandated by the regulations. 32 C.F.R. §
888e.10 (1974). See also Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971).
1 In his application, Airman Cole asserted that the incident which caused his change
of heart was his realization that he was learning to equip aircraft with conventional
weapons and not just nuclear weapons. Cole stated that he had not objected to equipping
aircraft with nuclear bombs because in his own mind he doubted that nuclear warheads
would ever be employed, but that he could not bring himself to place conventional weapons on aircraft knowing that some day they might be put into actual use. 494 F.2d at 145.
Initially, these views seem contradictory or at least difficult to attribute to a conscientious
objector. Apparently these statements were Cole's description of the "incident" which
crystallized his views, after which Cole would work with neither kind of bomb-nuclear
nor conventional.
Captain Smith's crystallization occurred under different circumstances. His medical
education had been financed by the Air Force and he was engaged in a governmentsponsored internship in pediatrics when he was notified in April 1971 that he was to be
assigned to a normal Air Force active duty station and not pediatrics. Captain Smith
asserted that:
[Tihe motivating force behind my application for Conscientious Objector
status was a direct result of my belief in the sacredness of the Human Spirit
. . .[because] . . .I had to a great degree dealt with my beliefs and their
consequences by denying their meaning, rationalizing that as a pediatrician
I would not really be fulfilling a military role . . .and would thus be
able to serve out my obligation . . . . [Upon notification of my new position], I fully realized that . . . I would clearly be performing a military
function. . . . [T]hus I would be playing a definite part in supporting the
violation of the Human Spirit.
486 F.2d at 312 (footnote omitted).
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psychiatrist,8 a chaplain,' and a hearing or investigating officer.' 0
In Cole's case, all interviewers agreed that he was sincere in his
beliefs about conscientious objection. Smith's interviewers were
likewise impressed with his sincerity; however, the hearing officer
recommended approval of the application in Smith but recommended denial in Cole. 2 After the interview reports were completed, each applicant was allowed 15 days by regulation in which
to submit a rebuttal.' 3 Smith filed a comprehensive rebuttal" but
Cole did not." Each applicant's file was then forwarded to the
local staff judge advocate for legal review. The judge advocate
recommended that both applications be denied." The files then
proceeded upward within their respective chains of command,
being denied at every level." The applications were finally and
formally denied at the highest level.'" Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus relief followed the final military decision.
The federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, apply the
"basis in fact" test to review military decisions." This scope of
review, described as "the narrowest known to law,"0 means that
a military decision will be upheld if there is any factual basis to
support it.
Cole's writ was denied by the District Court for the District
The psychiatrist examines for the presence of any psychiatric disorder which would
warrant treatment or disposition through medical channels. 32 C.F.R. § 888e.20 (1974).
1 A chaplain critiques and comments on the nature and basis of the applicant's
sincerity and depth of convictions. Id.
1*The investigating officer conducts a hearing and ascertains and assembles all relevant facts and creates a comprehensive record to facilitate an informed decision by higher
authority. Id. § 888e.22(b).
494 F.2d at 142.
" 486 F.2d at 310-11.
" 32 C.F.R. § 888e.24(f) (1974).
" 486 F.2d at 311.
' There was no need for Cole to file a rebuttal since there was no adverse information
to rebut. All interviewers had found him to be sincere.
1 Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307,
309 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 494 F.2d at 143; 486 F.2d at 309.
,SCole's application was finally denied by Headquarters-United States Air Force.
494 F.2d at 143. Since Smith was an officer, his application was finally denied by the
Secretary of the Air Force. See 32 C.F.R. § 888e.28 (1974).
" This test was first applied in Gilliam v. Reaves, 263 F. Supp. 378, 384 (W.D. La.
1966) to inservice conscientious objector cases as an outgrowth of the test used in selective
service cases announced in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). For a comprehensive list of courts applying this test, see Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED. 15, 92-93 (1972).
N Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Bishop v.
United States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1969).
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of Colorado2 and Smith's writ was granted by the District Court
for the District of New Mexico with the proviso that he serve the
remainder of his active duty commitment by performing civilian
22
alternative service.
On appeal, the "basis in fact" issue was reviewed in both
cases. 23 Captain Smith appealed from the portion of the district
court's order making his discharge conditional upon completion
of alternative service. 24 Cole raised a procedural due process question based upon Air Force Regulation 35-24.25

I.

BASIS IN FACT

In Smith the Tenth Circuit found that there was no basis in
fact to deny Captain Smith's claim. 26 The court reviewed the
hearing officer's report which had recommended disapproval of
the application on two grounds: first, Captain Smith took his
oath of office on the same day that he notified the Air Force of
his intention to seek classification as a conscientious objector;
and second, Captain Smith delayed in applying for discharge
when he was informed that he would not be assigned to practice
in pediatrics. Smith entered active duty and enrolled in medical
school in the fall of 1967; in the spring of 1971, he was informed
that he was ineligible for a sponsored residency in pediatrics; in
the fall of 1971 he took his oath as a member of the Air Force
Medical Corps in which he was to be assigned as a Flight Surgeon
or a General Medical Officer.27
The court found that both the oath and the delay were insuf494 F.2d at 142.
486 F.2d at 309.
23 The government raised the issue in Smith, 486 F.2d at 309-14, and Cole raised it
in his case, 494 F.2d at 145.
", The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in treating the
alternative service issue in Smith, attempted to balance the equities: Captain Smith's
sincere desire to leave the Air Force was weighed against the Air Force's desire to see that
its investment in Smith's medical education not be wasted. The Tenth Circuit found that
there was no statutory authority for imposing a condition upon release of an inservice
conscientious objector who has served more than 180 days. The court held:
[The decision to impose conditions, if any, on the discharge of in-service
conscientious objectors, including those who have had a portion or all of their
education paid for by the armed forces, is a question which should be resolved in the Congress . . ..
486 F.2d at 314. Accordingly, the alternative service requirement ordered by the district
court was reversed. Id. at 315.
2 494 F.2d at 142-44.
28 486 F.2d at 313.
" Id. at 308-09.
21

22
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ficient grounds upon which to base a finding of insincerity; and
although the oath and application were "superficially inconsistent action," both grounds were adequately explained in Smith's
28
rebuttal letter.
The government argued that due weight must be given to the
fact that eight Air Force command-level officers had reviewed
Smith's application and recommended denial. The court responded:
We deem of more importance, however, the reports of those who
actually interviewed2 Captain Smith and had an opportunity to observe his demeanor '

The treatment in Cole of the reviewing officer's comments
appears to be inconsistent with the treatment in Smith. In Cole,
Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, relied upon the reasoning of the judge advocate's report which had questioned Cole's
sincerity. 0 He did not rely on the reports of the interviewers
which had been considered determinative of sincerity in Smith.
This is surprising since only two of three interviewers found Captain Smith to be sincere while all three found Airman Cole to be
sincere. 3' The judge advocate's report, which Cole had no opportunity to rebut, was similar to the command-level reports disregarded in Smith; it was based upon the record and not on a
personal interview with Cole. Judge McWilliams, in denying
Cole's writ of habeas corpus, concluded that Cole's aversion to
war was more a passing result of his wife's influence than a per32
manent change in Cole's beliefs.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 313 (footnote omitted). The court added:
The review was conducted by career officers who had no personal contact with Captain Smith. Their recommendations that Doctor Smith's application be denied were based upon inferences drawn from an inanimate record, and all such recommendations were based not upon hard, reliable
provable facts but rather upon disbelief as to his sincerity, or the alleged
inconsistencies pointed out by the investigating officer ....
Id. at 313 n.13.
1 494 F.2d at 145. Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 397 (1953); United
States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1969).
The hearing officer recommended Cole for discharge. 494 F.2d at 142.
22 Id. at 145. Generally, the influence of a wife has not been sufficient to support a
"basis in fact" finding. In Cohen v. Laird, 315 F. Supp. 1265 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd 439 F.2d
866 (4th Cir. 1971), five inservice conscientious objector cases were joined. In the only
habeas corpus petition granted, serviceman Green asserted "that, with his marriage, his
religious impulse quickened and his unalterable opposition to participation in war crystallized." Id. at 1276. The court, despite this pronouncement by the serviceman, noted that
"petitioner was influenced by and was expressing the opinions of his wife. [However, the]
Board completely disregarded, and took no note of, the reports of the chaplain, the psychi-
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Since the issue in both cases was the determination of sincerity and since it has been recognized that those having personal
contact with the applicant are in the best position to judge sincerity, as suggested in Smith, the Smith decision seems to be consistent while the Cole decision seems to be inconsistent with controlling precedent.'
II.

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

The second issue which the court reviewed in Cole was the
due process question. Cole based his claim on Air Force Regulation 35-24, paragraph 13:
Any additional information other than the official service record of
the applicant considered by [Headquarters-United States Air
Force] which is adverse to the applicant, and which the applicant
has not had an opportunity to comment upon or refute, will be made
a part of the record and the applicant will be given a 15-day opportunity from date of receipt of the additional information to comment
upon or refute the material before a final decision is made. The
reasons for an adverse decision will be made a part of the record and
will be provided to the individual."

Cole argued that he was entitled to examine the negative
recommendations of the command-level reviewers since these
reports contributed new information to the file which he had not
had an opportunity to rebut before the final decision was made
by Headquarters-United States Air Force. He alleged, therefore,
that the failure to provide this opportunity was a denial of procedural due process.3
Judge McWilliams responded to this argument by adopting
the district court's analysis of the regulation:
atrist and the . . .hearing officer ...." Id. at 1278. The court held that there was no
basis in fact to deny serviceman Green's conscientious objection claim. The similarity of
facts between Cohen and Cole is striking. In both cases command-level reviewers ignored
the positive recommendations of the interviewers and mistakenly attached significance to
the influence of petitioners' wives. Cf. Emerson v. McKean, 322 F. Supp. 251, 256 (N.D.
Ala. 1971) (petitioner's family concerns were questioned).
S3 See, e.g., Ferrand v. Seamans, 488 F.2d 1386, 1390 (2d Cir. 1973); Rastin v. Laird,
445 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751,
755 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413 F.2d 936, 937-38 (4th Cir.
1969); Chamoy v. Schlesinger, 371 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D. Hawaii 1974); Taylor v. Chaffee,
327 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Talford v. Seaman, 306 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.
Md. 1969); Reitemeyer v. McCrea, 302 F. Supp. 1210, 1221 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd sub horn.
Quaglia v. Boswell, 423 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir. 1970).
" 32 C.F.R. § 888e.28 (1974).
3 Brief for Appellant at 6, Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974).
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This difference in semantics [between information and reasons]
demonstrates that the choice of terms is not accidental. Information
is certainly different from reasons, and therefore

. .

. [Cole] should

be and was afforded an opportunity to rebut any factual matter in
the file but does not have the right to comment on and rebut the
reasoning giving rise to each conclusion made at various levels of

command.u

The court distinguished on their facts the two cases relied
upon by the appellant, Gonzales v. United States 7 and Crotty v.
Kelly.38 The Cole court observed that Gonzales dealt with a recommendation which became the factual basis for the final decision denying a selective service applicant conscientious objector
status, but the disputed recommendation in Cole was one made
only in the chain of command decisional process and contained
no new factual matter.3 9 Judge McWilliams concluded that the
command decision had complied with Air Force regulations and
that due process requirements had been fulfilled.' 0
In focusing on the factual differences, however, the court
misconceived the significance and import of Gonzales. Gonzales
recognized, as implicit in the selective service regulations, the
applicant's right to be aware of any adverse information which
might be considered by the final decisionmaker." Although
Gonzales involved a selective service applicant, its holding has
been applied not only to different military regulations in both
" 494 F.2d at 144.
31 348 U.S. 407 (1955). Gonzales involved a registrant who had sought a conscientious
objector exemption from his local draft board. After his draft board denied his claim, the
registrant appealed. Under the procedure then applicable, the appeal board consulted the
Department of Justice which conducted an investigation and recommended denial of the
conscientious objector classification. The appeal board accepted and relied upon the recommendation. The registrant never saw the adverse Department of Justice report. He
then appealed to the courts on due process grounds. See also Simmons v. United States,
348 U.S. 397 (1955); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
443 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971).
494 F.2d at 144.
a Id.
" Mr. Justice Clark observed it is
[i]mplicit in the Act and Regulations-viewed against our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play-that a copy of the recommendation of the Department [of Justice] be furnished the registrant at the
time it is forwarded to the Appeal Board, and that he be afforded an opportunity to reply.
348 U.S. 407, 412 (1955) (footnote omitted). He then concluded:
[Tihe right to file a statement before the Appeal Board includes the right
to file a meaningful statement, one based on all the facts in the file and made
with awareness of the recommendations and arguments to be countered.
Id. at 415.
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selective service' 2 and inservice conscientious objector cases, '3 but
also to hearings under the Federal Food and Cosmetic Act," to
discharge from the Michigan State Civil Service,' 5 to motions for
preliminary injunction for violations of the Sherman Act," and to
a motion for review of construction subsidy awards by the Maritime Subsidy Board of the Maritime Administration."
Judge McWilliams indicated that Crotty did not apply because the inservice conscientious objector applicant in Crotty had
not been given a copy of the interviewing officers' reports, which
had been supplied to Cole."8 However, by focusing on these factual differences, the court overlooked several facets of the Crotty
decision. Judge Coffin in Crotty emphasized the final nature of
the Conscientious Objector Review Board. This Board was the
final decisionmaker (as the appeal board in Gonzales and Headquarters-United States Air Force in Cole) which should have
access to all available information, including the applicant's responses to unfavorable recommendations." Judge Coffin also acknowledged the policy of fundamental fairness implicit in the
Gonzales decision:
42 E.g., United States v. Thompson, 431 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Cabbage, 430 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
" Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214 (lst Cir. 1971); Violi v. Reese, 343 F. Supp. 462 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); Finley v. Drew, 337 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd 455 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1972);
cf. Rohe v. Froehlke, 500 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1974) (reservist called to active duty for
accumulation of unexcused absences from unit training assemblies successfully relied
upon Gonzales). But see O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1971); Caruso v.
Toothaker, 331 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (reservists' reliance upon Gonzales was
unsuccessful).
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Kleindienst, 464 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.6 (3d Cir. 1972).
Viculin v. Department of Civil Service, 386 Mich. 375, 192 N.W.2d 449, 462 (1971).
, Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 356 (5th
Cir. 1971).
11 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568, 585 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
But see O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 862
(1959) (unsuccessful effort to inspect revenue agent's reports) and Pearce v. United States,
262 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1958) (unsuccessful effort to inspect probation report).
, 494 F.2d at 144.
, Crotty v. Kelly, 443 F.2d 214, 216 (1st Cir. 1971). Judge Coffin in Crotty suggested
that:
The Army procedure is more final than the Appeal Board procedure in
Gonzales. There, at least, there was some provision for "rehearing" because
the registrant could examine his file, including the Department's recommendation, after the Board's disapproval and could seek a re-opening if he found
erroneous information. No similar provision exists in the military procedures

Id. at 216 n.1.
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The reasoning of that opinion [Gonzales] was not based upon the
intricacies of the particular regulations under scrutiny but was
based upon "underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic
fair play."

The Crotty court not only adopted the rationale of Gonzales
but extended it, recognizing a trend for broader availability of
adverse information.5 ' Crotty, decided under Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, obliged the military to provide a copy
of the interviewing officers' reports where there had been no duty
before.5" The court in Crotty found "implicit in the regulation"
the due process requirement that applicants be given an opportunity to rebut adverse interview reports. Cole, decided under the
revised directive of 1971 in which the military was compelled to
disclose these adverse interview reports to the applicant, provided an opportunity to find "implicit in the regulation" the right
of the applicant to review command level recommendations as
well.
Another view of the Cole fact pattern and of Air Force Regulation 35-24 paragraph 13 is suggested by a recent Eighth Circuit
decision, Chilgren v. Schlesinger.5 3 In Chilgren the due process
and basis in fact issues were juxtaposed to raise this question: If
the command-level reviewers did not provide adverse factual information, as was argued by the government in the due process
portion of its brief,5" and if all interview reports were favorable,
what basis in fact was there to deny the conscientious objector
claim? All of the information prior to the command-level review
Id. at 217.

United States v. Fisher, 442 F.2d 109, 116 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cummins, 425 F.2d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 489
',

(1969).
52 Crotty was decided under Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (1969) where
there was no duty to disclose interviewing officers' reports. The applicable section in the
revised directive is found at 32 C.F.R. § 888e.24(f) (1974).
- 499 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir. 1974):
It is argued, on the one hand, that the Air Force was not required to furnish
the record to [Chilgren] because it contained no adverse information; yet,
on the other hand, [the government] argue[s] that there was a basis in fact
in that same record which justified reversal of hearing officers' recommendations in [Chilgren's] favor. We fail to see how such a basis in fact could be
found in a record containing no adverse information.
" Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Cole v. Clements, 494 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1974). The
government argued that:
[AIIl the recommendations of the entire chain of command were merely
comments of the file as the applicant had prepared it.... They contained
no new information and consisted solely in critical evaluation of matters
known to the applicant.
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was favorable to Airman Cole. Since there was no adverse factual
information in Cole's file, there could be no adverse decision.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Cole decision appears to be inconsistent with current
precedent. The court's review of the "basis in fact" for denial of
the application in Cole is in conflict with the review in Smith
where the application was granted. Additionally, the decision in
Cole seems to be inconsistent with the due process policy of fundamental fairness in Gonzales and Crotty.
E. Stephen Temko

VII. AMERICAN INDIANS
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the third and final stage of a dispute which
had involved 6 years of litigation.
Initially, the Cherokees, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws
as intervenors, brought suit against the State of Oklahoma and
holders of various leases on mineral rights to the bed of the Arkansas River.' Because of the shift in the flow of the river, valuable sand, gravel, oil, and gas deposits were exposed. The Indian
tribes claimed that the riverbed lands had been conveyed to them
by the United States; they sought both an accounting of lease
monies and an injunction.' The State counterclaimed for a decree
to quiet title in Oklahoma. 4 The trial court and the Tenth Circuit
rendered judgment for the State. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
The second phase arose on remand to the trial court. The
parties disagreed over whether the Supreme Court had decided
present title to the riverbed or only past title.' The trial court held
that the Supreme Court had determined present title. The parties
also disagreed over the amount of damages to be paid, some con490 F.2d 521 (10th Cir. 1974).
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 742.
4Id.

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, rehearingdenied, 398 U.S. 945 (1970).
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1972).
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tending that they were entitled to the value of the minerals taken
and others contending that they were entitled to the amount of
the lease payments. Total receipts in lease payments collected by
the State totalled $786,541.67. The trial court held that Oklahoma should account for all of the lease, rental, and royalty payments received.! These findings were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.,
The last phase involved a dispute over the payment of interest on these funds. Pursuant to the Oklahoma constitution,' the
lease payments had been placed in the permanent school trust
fund. The principal could not be invaded, but the interest or
income could be and was paid periodically to school districts
throughout the State.'" The amount of interest claimed to have
been earned and to be due to the Indian tribes was $212,423.83."
The trial court disallowed the claim for interest. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit recognized the issue implicit in the dispute: "The
problem faced by the trial court . . . is . . . [that] the monies
for which an accounting was sought were no longer in existence,
having been expended by the State pursuant to constitutional
mandate."'" The Tenth Circuit concluded, based upon the applicable Oklahoma law, that "the trial court's action disallowing
and not
interest under all the circumstances was equitable,
3
clearly erroneous" in this "difficult situation.'

DUE PROCESS-MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Abeyta v. Town of Taos,
499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974)
Several employees of the Taos, New Mexico police department were dismissed in 1972 when the department was reorganized. Each dismissal was based upon specific allegations of misfeasance. In Abeyta v. Town of Taos,' the discharged employees
VIII.

Id. at 677.
Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
(1972).
art. XI, §§ 2, 3.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 490 F.2d 521, 523-24 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 524.
* OKLA. CONST.

"

Id. at 526.

,3 Id. at 527.
499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
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sought reinstatements and back wages. The District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied relief to all but one of the employ2
ees.
On appeal, the first issue raised by the plaintiffs challenged
the procedure followed by the town council in approving the dismissals. Taos had a mayor-council form of government with four
council positions. The mayor had no statutory authority to vote
in council deliberations except in the event of a tie vote by the
council.3 A New Mexico statute provided that a municipal employee could be discharged only by a majority vote of all council
members.' In the case of one plaintiff, two council members and
the mayor voted for his dismissal, one council member voted
against, and the fourth council member was absent at the time
of the vote. Since not all of the council members had participated
in the vote which did not result in a tie, the vote of the mayor
was improper.' Notwithstanding this defect, the district court
refused to order reinstatement and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the town council could properly
discharge the plaintiff regardless of the vote of the absent councilman. If, at the next meeting, that councilman were to vote for
dismissal, the statutory majority for dismissal would be realized.
If he were to vote for retention, a tie vote would result and the
mayor could then properly exercise his right to break the tie in
favor of dismissal. Therefore, the court observed that the prayedfor relief "would be ephemeral at best."6
Plaintiffs' second and major contention on appeal was that
their employment was a "property" interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause which required a
hearing on their dismissals. The court responded with the general
rule that public employees do not have a property interest in their
employment.' Exceptions to this general rule exist in cases where
2 By order of the district court, affirmed on appeal, a woman clerical employee was
reinstated with back wages. She had received a termination letter from the police chief
which stated that there was no place in the department for a woman. In a letter to the
police commission, the police chief cited the following reasons for her dismissal: job
related incompetence, sexual misconduct with male members of the department, and
failure to turn over traffic fines received by her to the police magistrate. Since these
allegations injured her reputation, it was held that failure to hold a hearing on her dismissal was a violation of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 325-26.
1 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-3 (1953).
4 Id. § 14-10-6(D)(1).
' 499 F.2d at 328.

*Id.
Id. at 327. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973).
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the employees hold contracts for continuing employment, for example, tenured teachers.' In this case, however, the court noted
that the plaintiffs had no contract with the town and no agreement as to any term of employment. Consequently, their employment was "terminable at will."' Since due process did not attach
to such employment as a property interest, the town had not
violated any constitutional right in failing to hold a hearing on
the dismissals.'"
Plaintiffs also argued that the town's allegations of misfeasance as grounds for dismissal had damaged their reputations and
chances for obtaining new employment. Although some of the
charges involved gross and possibly criminal misconduct," the
court of appeals dismissed this argument on the theory that the
charges did not allege dishonesty or immorality.' 2 The court
stated that the plaintiffs had produced "no evidence whatsoever
' 3
to support this argument." '
As their fourth and final point of appeal, plaintiffs alleged
that they were dismissed for exercising their right of free speech
in sending a grievance letter to the police chief. Inasmuch as
specific grounds of misfeasance had been set forth in terminating
each plaintiff's employment, the court of appeals found this argument to be without merit."
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972):
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support
his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972):
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it.
499 F.2d at 327. Accord, 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs 292-93 (Supp. 1971).
ID Due process rights affecting public employees may arise by virtue of other circumstances. Supra note 2.
1, Among the charges were the following: shooting at a police car, shooting out windows in town, lack of judgment in confidential matters, mistreatment of persons arrested
for traffic violations, and disobeying orders. 499 F.2d at 326 nn. 1 & 2.
,I Compare the allegations supra note 2 with those supra note 11.
,3 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that some plaintiffs had already found
new employment. Those who had not, the court further noted, were unwilling to seek
employment away from Taos. 499 F.2d at 327-28.
" Id. at 328. Specifically excepted from this finding was the plaintiff referred to in
note 2 supra.

